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Abstract
We provide a polynomial algorithm to find the value and an optimal
strategy for a generalization of the Pig game. Modeled as a competi-
tive Markov decision process, the corresponding Bellman equations can
be decoupled leading to systems of two non-linear equations with two un-
knowns. In this way we avoid the classical iterative approaches. A simple
complexity analysis reveals that the algorithm requires O(s log s) steps,
where s is the number of states of the game. The classical Pig and the
Piglet (a simple variant of the Pig played with a coin) are examined in
detail.
AMS MSC 2010: Primary: 91A15 91A60; Secondary: 90C47.
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1 Introduction
Pig is a popular competitive dice game of the family of jeopardy games. It is a
turn based game with two players. Let us describe first the turn of one player,
that can be considered as a solitaire variant of the game. The player rolls a die.
If he gets a one (the pig) he looses the turn, ending it with zero points. If he
gets a number different from one (say a 4), he scores this result and faces two
options: (i) to bank his points, ending the turn with his first obtained points
(4), or (ii) to roll the die again. The conditions of this second roll are: if he gets
a one he looses the score obtained in the first roll (his turn account falls from
4 to 0) and the turn is finished. If he gets a number different from one (say a
5) he adds this result to the first one, (increasing to 9) and has again to decide
whether to roll or to hold. If he rolls and gets a one, his account goes to 0 (from
9 to 0) and if he gets a number different from one (say a 3) this number is added
to his score (increasing to 12). The turn continues under the same conditions,
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until the player decides to hold, or gets a one. This single turn can be modeled
as a stochastic optimization problem, as after each roll with a result different
from one, the player has to decide whether to roll the die, possibly increasing
his points –risking to loose these obtained points– or to stop rolling, ending the
turn with these points as reward. This turn, considered as a solitaire game, has
an optimal rule: to maximize the expected score, the player should roll until
the first time he accumulates 20 points or more. The maximum expected score
is 8.1418 points (Roters [17]).
We now describe the full competitive Pig game. There are two players, who
play by turns as described above. There is a general account for each player,
where they bank the points obtained after deciding to hold (ending the turn),
passing the die to the other player. (These general accounts do not decrease.)
The first player in scoring 100 or more points wins the game.
Piglet is a simple version of Pig played with a coin instead of a die. It was
introduced by Neller and Presser [16]. In the Piglet, the winner is the first
player to obtain 10 heads. During his turn, each player repeatedly flips a coin
until either a tail is obtained or he decides to hold and score the number of
consecutive flipped heads. Beside its simplicity, it is interesting to note that
this game is a particular case of a simple stochastic game (SSG), as introduced
by Condon [3]. The solitaire variant of the piglet game has threshold one and
maximum expected reward 1/2.
The generalized pig game (GPG) is an abstract form of the previous games,
played with a “special die” with faces 0, . . . , n and probabilities p0, . . . , pn (p0 +
· · ·+ pn = 1) respectively. The first of two players in scoring N or more points
wins the game. Similar to the Pig and Piglet, if in his turn a player rolls the die
and obtains a zero, the turn ends without increasing the general score, whereas
if the turn ends by the player’s decision, the turn score (sum of the outcomes
within the turn) is added to his general score. The Pig is a GPG with n = 6,
p0 = 1/6, p1 = 0, pi = 1/6 (i = 2, . . . , 6), and N = 100. In the case of the Piglet
the parameters are n = 2, p0 = p1 = 1/2, and N = 10.
Solitaire variants of the Pig game were studied by Roters [17] and Roters
and Haigh [7]. The first solution for the competitive Pig game was obtained
by Neller and Presser [16], with the help of a value iteration algorithm. Tijms
[20] considers also the competitive pig game and a simultaneous-decision-taking
variant, named Hog (see also [21]), and Louchard [12] examines some optimal
strategies for the solitaire and competitive variants of the game. In these papers,
no complexity analysis of the proposed algorithms is presented.
From a theoretical point of view, the GPG is a zero-sum turn-based Com-
petitive Markov Decision Process, in the terminology of Filar and Vrieze [5], or
a two-player zero-sum turn-based stochastic game (labelled as 2TBSG following
Hansen et al. [9]), in the terminology of Shapley [18]. An important theoret-
ical difference between turn-based games and the classic simultaneously-taken
actions ones, initiated in the work by von Neumann and Morgenstern [15], is
that simultaneity usually implies the need of randomized strategies to obtain
optimality, whereas in the framework of turn-based games it is usually possible
to find deterministic optimal strategies.
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Regarding solutions (i.e. finding the value and an optimal strategy), Vrieze
et al. [22] provide an algorithm to solve a general 2TBSG. The finiteness of this
algorithm has been established, and the order field property (the solution of the
game belongs to the same algebraic field as the data) follows from their analysis
(see also Theorem 6.3.3 in [5]).
As was mentioned our game can be seen to be a Simple Stochastic Game
(SSG), and therefore all the theoretical results for this class of games apply.
In particular it is known that, for stochastic mean-payoff games, both players
have optimal pure stationary strategies (Liggett and Lipman [13]), and this
result provides the corresponding result for the transient game we consider, as
it can be transformed into a stochastic mean-payoff game by adding an extra
action with reward one that loops at every absorbing state in which player
one is the winner, while all other actions have null rewards. Furthermore, in
this framework, a finite algorithm always exists simply because the number
of strategies composed by pure stationary actions is finite. Since the number
of these strategies is exponential in the number a of the states of the game
corresponding to of the players (if each of these states has two possible actions,
there are 2a strategies), this finite search algorithm is exponential. For more
details about SSGs see [3] and [4].
Hoffman and Karp [10] provide a strategy iteration algorithm to solve non-
terminating stochastic games. Strategy iteration algorithms are analyzed by
several authors. Tripathi et al. [19] provide a bound of O(2s/s) for its complex-
ity in the case of SSGs. Another approach consists in the reduction of the SSG
to linear programming type problems. In this direction Halman [8] provides the
bound eO(
√
s log s) for the expected complexity, where s is the number of states
of the game, based on Matousˇek et al. [14]. Condon [3] proves that solving a
general SSG belongs to a certain complexity class (more precisely NP∩ co-NP,
the details in [3]). Condon [4] also analyzes several other algorithms for SSGs,
including modifications of the Hoffman-Karp algorithm, explains why certain
naive algorithms do not provide the correct answer, and establishes a quadratic
programming algorithm to solve SSGs. Within other more recent proposals, we
can mention one algorithm based on permutations of the random nodes of a SSG
(Gimbert and Horn [6]), and another one by Ibsen-Jensen and Miltersen [11],
that combining value iteration and backward-induction (retrograde analysis)
slightly improves the time complexity of the previous one. Another approach is
to analyze games with few cycles, as it is known that games without cycles can
be solved in polynomial time (Auger et al. [1]). Nevertheless, the existence of
polynomial time algorithms for SSGs is still a challenging open question.
In the present paper we propose a new algorithm to find the value and an
optimal strategy for the GPG. This algorithm differs from the usual iterative (in
value or in policy) ones and finds the solution directly by a backward-induction.
The number of operations performed by our algorithm is polynomial in the tar-
get score N of the game and also in the number s of states of the game. (A
more detailed analysis of complexity would require to consider rational proba-
bilities.) It should be noticed that the GPG we analyze, considered as a SSG,
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has a large proportion of random nodes, and also a large amount of cycles, so
the general algorithms proposed when this quantities are small are not of use.
In this way the algorithm we propose answers the complexity question for SSG
for our particular class of stochastic games.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we formulate the mathemat-
ical model of the game and the corresponding Bellman equations. In section
3 we present our main result: the algorithm and its complexity analysis. In
section 4 we show some numerical results for the pig and piglet games. A brief
conclusion is the content of section 5.
2 The mathematical model
In this section we formulate the elements of the competitive Markov decision
process we consider to model the GPG and write the corresponding Bellman
equations. Following [5] we define: the state space; the set of available actions
each player has at a given state; and, given the pair (state, action), the reward
of the players and the probability distribution for the next state.
2.1 States
The states of the game at a given moment is described by the accumulated score
of each player and the turn score of the player who is rolling the die. Instead
of considering the accumulated score of each player, we consider the remaining
points to win, which contain the same information and are more convenient for
our analysis. Based on these facts we consider states of the form (a, b, τ, j),
where a and b (0 < a, b ≤ N) are the respective amounts of points that player
one and player two need to win the game, τ is the turn score of player j, while
j = 1, 2 indicates which player is rolling the die. If j = 1 then 0 ≤ τ ≤ a+n−1,
while if j = 2 we have 0 ≤ τ ≤ b+ n− 1. It is also necessary to consider a final
absorbing state GO (game over). As the game is symmetric, we usually consider
states with j = 1, and omit this information when it is not strictly necessary,
i.e. we identify (a, b, τ) = (a, b, τ, 1). Observe finally that, for large N , we have
s = O(N3), where s denotes the number of states of the game.
2.2 Actions
As we mentioned, we analyze the states with j = 1, in which player two has no
action to choose. When a turn begins, i.e. at state (a, b, 0), player one has only
one possible action: to roll the die. Within the turn, i.e. when 0 < τ < a he
can roll or hold. In states with τ > a the only possible action is to hold. In the
special state GO there is no action to choose.
2.3 Probability transitions
We define the probability distribution for the next state depending on the
present state and action taken by the player. Again we describe just player
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one’s states. From a state (a, b, τ), with 0 < τ < a, if the player decides to
hold, the game moves to state (a− τ, b, 0, 2) with probability one. From a state
(a, b, τ), with 0 ≤ τ < a if the player rolls, the following state will be (a, b, 0, 2)
with probability p0, and (a, b, τ + i, 1) with probability pi for i = 1 . . . n. From
a state (a, b, τ), with τ > a, and also from the state GO, the following state will
be GO with probability one.
2.4 Payoffs
As player one aims to maximize his winning probability, we define the payoff
such that the sum of all his payoffs during the game is one if he wins and zero
otherwise. To this end we define the payoff to be one at states (a, b, τ), with
τ > a, when player one decides to hold (only available action). In any other case
the payoff is zero. Since we are considering a zero-sum game, we do not need
to define the payoff for player two. Observe that, with the defined payoff, the
expectation of the sum (over all steps of the game) of all the payoffs, coincides
with the winning probability of player one.
2.5 Sub-games
A relevant feature of the GPG is that, once a player obtained certain points
in his general account it, is not possible to lose them. From the side of the
competitive Markov decision process, this particularity of the game implies that
once the process entered in a state (a, b, τ, j), in the subsequent states it will not
visit states (a′, b′, τ ′, j′) with a′ > a or b′ > b. This allow us to define for each a
and b a sub-game, with space state restricted to {(a′, b′, τ ′, j′) : a′ ≤ a, b′ ≤ b}.
2.6 Game value and Bellman equations
Based on general results for competitive Markov decision process we formulate
the optimization problem and write the corresponding Bellman equations that
give the value and an optimal strategy of the game. For general details and
basic definitions see Chapter 4 in [5]. As was discussed above, the transient
game has a value and a stationary deterministic optimal strategy within the
class of behavioral strategies. The value of the game is then
v = P(player one wins from state (N,N, 0)),
where P stands for probability, and both players use their optimal strategies in
the class of behavioral strategies. With the same convention, we define values
at intermediate states, by
v(a, b, τ, j) = P(player one wins from state (a, b, τ, j)),
omitting j when j = 1, and also omitting τ when τ = 0. With this shorter
notation v = v(N,N). Due to the transience of the game (i.e. it ends with
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probability one) and to its symmetry, we have
P(player one wins from state (a, b, 0, 2))
= 1−P(player two wins from state (a, b, 0, 2))
= 1−P(player one wins from state (b, a, 0, 1)),
that in terms of the values of the game means
v(a, b, 0, 2) = 1− v(b, a, 0, 1) = 1− v(b, a).
Using the notation
vroll(a, b, τ) = p0 (1− v(b, a)) +
n∑
i=1
piv(a, b, τ + i), (1)
the Bellman equations of the game can be written in a compact form, only for
j = 1, as
v(a, b, τ) =

vroll(a, b, 0), τ = 0,
max
{
1− v(b, a− τ), vroll(a, b, τ)
}
, 0 < τ < a,
1, τ ≥ a.
(2)
Observe that if we restrict a solution of the Bellman equations of the game to
the states considered in one of the sub-games defined in Section 2.5, we obtain
a solution of the Bellman equations of the sub-game. This fact shows that the
solution of a sub-game makes part of the solution of the game.
3 Main results
Theorem 3.1. There exists a finite algorithm that gives the value and an opti-
mal strategy of the generalized pig game with target N . This algorithm requires
O(N3 logN) steps, which in terms of the number s of states of the game is
O(s log s).
The proof of the Theorem consists in the presentation of the algorithm and
the posterior analysis of its complexity. Our algorithm is based in the following
facts:
• The states of the sub-game for a = α and b = β can be decomposed: for
α = 1, into the states of the smaller sub-game for a = 1 and b = β − 1,
plus the states of the form (1, β, τ, j); and for α > 1, into the states of
the smaller sub-game for a = α− 1 and b = β plus the states of the form
(α, β, τ, j). This allows to implement a backward algorithm.
• To find the solution of the sub-game for a, b, assuming that is already
known the value of the smaller sub-game described in the previous item,
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one should find the value of the game for the remainder states, i.e. the
ones of the form (a, b, τ, j). Taking into account the reduction to states of
player one, this means that the unknown values are that of states of the
form (a, b, τ) and (b, a, τ).
These remarks are consequences of the form of the game and the possible tran-
sitions of the underlying Markov process that arises once the actions are taken,
and provide a decoupling of the large optimization problem necessary to solve
the game, into a series of smaller problems that are solved sequentially.
From these observations we conclude that we can solve the equations recur-
sively backwards, beginning by a = b = 1, afterwards fixing b and solving for
a = 1, . . . , b, from b = 1 to b = N . This remark also implies that the winning
probabilities from a given state, do not depend on the target N of the game,
but only on a and b, the respective points that players one and two need to win
the game. This discussion leads to the general Algorithm 1
3.1 Pseudo-code for solving the game
Algorithm 1 General backward algorithm.
1: for b from 1 to N do
2: for a from 1 to b do
3: Find v(a, b, τ) : 0 ≤ τ < a and v(b, a, τ) : 0 ≤ τ < b
4: end for
5: end for
Regarding the complexity, as s = O(N3), we must verify that the required
number of steps is O(N3 logN). Here we observe that if c(a, b) is the the com-
plexity of step 3 (fixed a, b), and if c(a, b) ≤ c(N,N), then the whole algorithm
complexity is at most O(N2c(N,N)).
3.2 Solving step 3 for fixed a, b
In order to implement the above algorithm it is necessary to solve step 3 for
fixed a and b. From (2), the corresponding Bellman equations for v(a, b, τ) with
τ = a− 1, a− 2, . . . , 0, are
v(a, b, a− i) = max
{
1− v(b, i), vroll(a, b, a− 1)
}
, (i = 1, . . . , a− 1) (3)
v(a, b) = vroll(a, b, 0). (4)
while for v(b, a, τ), with τ = b− 1, b− 2, . . . , 0, are:
v(b, a, b− j) = max
{
1− v(a, j), vroll(b, a, b− 1)
}
, (j = 1, . . . , b− 1) (5)
v(b, a) = vroll(b, a, 0). (6)
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We assume, in accordance with the Algorithm 1, that in the previous steps
we have already found v(b, 1), . . . , v(b, a − 1) and v(a, 1), . . . , v(a, b − 1). The
following result analyzes equations (3)-(4), to show that v(a, b, a − i) depends
only on already known values and on v(b, a). Similarly, from (5)-(6), we have
that v(b, a, b − i) depends on already known values and on v(a, b). For the
following result we introduce the Markov chain {Xt : t = 1, 2, . . . } of the scores
corresponding to one turn of a player who always roll, and starts from X0 = 0.
Denote by Θz the first hitting time of level z. In particular Θ0 is the absorption
time.
Proposition 1. Assuming v(b, 1), . . . , v(b, a−1); v(a, 1), . . . , v(a, b−1) as known
values, then v(a, b, a− i) (i = 1, . . . , a−1) depend only on v(b, a), and v(b, a, b−
i) (i = 1, . . . , b−1) depend only on v(a, b). Furthermore, the function fa,b,i : [0, 1]→
[0, 1], (i ≤ a) such that v(a, b, a− i) = fa,b,i(v(b, a)), satisfies:
(a) For i ≤ 0, we have fa,b,i(y) = 1 for all y ∈ [0, 1].
(b) For i = 0, . . . , a, function fa,b,i is piecewise linear, convex (so continuous)
and non-increasing. It satisfies fa,b,i(0) = 1, fa,b,i(1) > 0 and it has
up to i points of non-differentiability, of which i − 1 are points of non-
differentiability of some fa,b,j for j < i.
(c) Denoting fa,b = fa,b,0, we have f
′
a,b(0) = −P(Θ0 < Θa) > −1.
(d) fa,b is strictly decreasing.
Proof. The proof of (a) is by induction on i. First observe that (3) can be
rewritten as v(a, b, a− 1) = max{1− v(b, 1), 1− p0v(b, a)}. Then we have
fa,b,1(y) = max{1− v(b, 1), 1− p0y}.
As v(b, 1) is known from a previous step of the algorithm, we have as a function
of y is piecewise linear, continuous, non-increasing, with up to one point of
non-differentiability, and satisfies fa,b,1(0) = 1 and fa,b,1(1) > 0. Assuming the
statement is valid for j = 1, . . . , i− 1, where a > i > 1, one just need to observe
that v(a, b, a− i) is the maximum between 1− v(b, i), which is constant in [0, 1],
and
vroll(a, b, a− i)(y) = p0(1− y) + p1fa,b,i−1(y) + . . .+ pnfa,b,i−n(y),
which is a linear combination of piecewise linear, continuous functions, that
satisfy vroll(a, b, a − i)(0) = 1. This shows that fa,b,i is also piecewise linear
and continuous, and its possible points of non-differentiability are the ones from
fa,b,i−j , j = 1, . . . , n plus the point y in which vroll(a, b, a − i)(y) = 1 − v(b, i).
In order to verify (b) we differentiate at the point y = 0 the equations in (2),
when τ < a, applying the chain rule. When y = v(b, a) = 0 the maximum in
(2) is the second expression, and the derivative is:
v(a, b, τ)′(0) = −p0 +
n∑
i=1
piv(a, b, τ + i)
′(0).
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In these equations, whenever τ + i ≥ a we have v(a, b, τ + i)′(0) = 0. On the
other hand, due to the Markov property, for a ≥ 2 we have that
P(Θ0 < Θa−τ ) = p0 +
n∑
i=1
pi P
(
Θ0 < Θa−(τ+i)
)
, (τ = 0, . . . , a − 1).
We conclude that the sequence of values {−v(a, b, τ)′(0) : τ = 0, . . . , a− 1} and
the sequence of probabilities {P (Θ0 < Θτ ) : τ = 0, . . . , a− 1} satisfy the same
recurrence relations, with the same initial condition −v(a, b, a−1)′(0) = P(Θ0 <
Θ1) = p0. This proves (c) concluding the proof of the proposition.
The previous result shows that, to solve solve step 3, it is enough to know
the functions fa,b,i, with i = 1, . . . , a and fb,a,i, with i = 1, . . . , b and to find
x = v(a, b) and y = v(b, a) that solve the system of two equations with two
unknowns: {
x = fa,b(y),
y = fb,a(x),
(7)
In order to solve step 3 we have Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Solving step 3 for fixed a, b.
1: for i from 1 to a do
2: Find the points defining fa,b,i
3: end for
4: for i from 1 to b do
5: Find the points defining fb,a,i
6: end for
7: Find x and y that solve system (7)
8: for i from 1 to a− 1 do
9: compute v(a,b,a-i)
10: end for
11: for i from 1 to b− 1 do
12: compute v(b,a,b-i)
13: end for
Proposition 2. To solve Algorithm 2 we use c(a, b) ≤ O(N logN) steps.
Proof. Step 3 in the algorithm may be decomposed into three sub-steps: (i) the
computation of the functions fa,b and fb,a; (ii) the computation of x = v(a, b)
and y = v(b, a) as the solution of the system (7); and (iii) the computation of
v(a, b, i) for i = 1, . . . , a − 1 and v(b, a, i) for i = 1, . . . , b − 1. We analyze the
complexity of each of these steps.
Regarding (i), as follows from Bellman equations (3) to (4), the function
fa,b is the maximum of a linear functions, so its determination is equivalent to
the determination of the common intersection of a half planes. This requires
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O(a log a) steps, as follows from Corollary 4.4 in [2]. We obtain in particular
the chain of points that determine this region.
In what respects (ii), based on assertions (a) and (b) in Proposition 1, we
know that the solution of the non-linear system above is unique, being the inter-
section of two polygonal curves (see Figure 1). The number of steps necessary to
find the intersection of two polygonal lines, each one given as a chain of points
is O((a+ b) log(a+ b)) if a and b are the respective number of points of the lines
(see Corollary 2.7, page 40 in [2]).
Regarding step (iii), knowning v(b, a), the determination of each value v(a, b, i)
demands a substitution, beginning by v(a, b, a− 1), requiring then O(a) steps.
The most demanding step is (ii), that requires a number of steps bounded
by O(N logN), concluding the proof of Proposition 2.
Figure 1: Function y = fb,a(x) (solid line) intersects x = fa,b(y) (dashed line)
at the solution x = v(a, b), y = v(b, a) in one instance of the Piglet game.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We finally observe that, once v(a, b) and v(b, a) are ob-
tained, an optimal strategy is computed checking where the maximum is at-
tained at each equation: if the maximum is vroll player one has to roll, otherwise
he has to hold. This concludes the proof of the Theorem.
Remark 1. A practical alternative to perform step 3 is to proceed by iteration,
finding the fixed point of the equation
x = fa,b (fb,a(x)) .
Considering g(x) = fa(fb(x)), it can be seen, as a consequence of (a) and (c)
in Proposition 1, that −1 < g′(x) < 0, ensuring that the fixed point of g can
be found iteratively. The values of x and y replaced in equations (3) to (6),
complete the solution of the step 3 of our algorithm, and give the value of the
game.
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Table 1: Pig Game with different targets
Target of the game (N) value of the game v(N,N)
10 0.70942388
50 0.54615051
100 0.530592071
200 0.52152913
500 0.51362019
1000 0.50963900
1 Obtained by Neller and Presser [16]
Remark 2. The solution of the nonlinear system can also be found as the
solution of the Linear Programming problem:{
min x+ y,
subject to: x ≥ fa,b(y), y ≥ fb,a(x).
as can be seen from Figure 1, and results from Proposition 1.
4 Examples
4.1 The pig game
In Table 1 we present the values of the Pig game for different target values.
Observe that the player who starts rolling has some advantage over his opponent,
being this advantage less significant as the target increases. For all target values
the value of the game is larger than 0.5 (as the game is symmetric) and decreases
to 0.5.
4.2 The piglet game
It is instructive to analyze the Piglet game as the function fa,b of Proposition 1
can be written explicitly, As the algorithm in subsection 3.1 solves the problem,
below we explain how to solve step 3.
4.2.1 The piglet game for fixed a ≤ b.
The unknowns are denoted by xτ = v(a, b, τ) for τ = 0, . . . , a − 1 and yσ =
v(b, a, σ) for σ = 0, . . . , b− 1. The knowns are denoted by x¯τ = 1− v(b, a− τ, 0)
and y¯σ = 1 − v(a, b − σ, 0) for the same range in τ and σ. In case a = b, as
v(a, b, τ) = v(b, a, τ) we have a knowns and a unknowns. The Bellman equations
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Table 2: Values of v(a, b) for the piglet game with N = 3.
3 2 1 b /a
2/9 2/5 2/3 1
4/11 4/7 4/5 2
6/11 8/11 8/9 3
are
x0 =
1− y0 + x1
2
, y0 =
1− x0 + y1
2
,
x1 = max
{
x¯1,
1− y0 + x2
2
}
, y1 = max
{
y¯1,
1− x0 + y2
2
}
,
x2 = max
{
x¯2,
1− y0 + x3
2
}
, y2 = max
{
y¯2,
1− x0 + y3
2
}
,
...
...
xa−2 = max
{
x¯a−2,
1− y0 + xa−1
2
}
, yb−2 = max
{
y¯b−2,
1− x0 + yb−1
2
}
,
xa−1 = max
{
x¯a−1,
1− y0 + 1
2
}
, yb−1 = max
{
y¯b−1,
1− x0 + 1
2
}
,
that, after recursive substitution, where we denoted x¯a = y¯b = 1, give the
following nonlinear system for x0, y0:
x0 = max
1≤τ≤a
{
1
2τ
[(2τ − 1)(1− y0) + x¯τ ]
}
,
y0 = max
1≤σ≤b
{
1
2σ
[(2σ − 1)(1− x0) + y¯σ]
}
.
In these equations, the properties (a), (b) and (c) of Proposition 1 are verified
directly. These equations allow to find the exact solution of the game (see Table
2).
5 Conclusions
In this paper we present an exact algorithm that solves a generalized version
of the Pig dice game. The fact that the value is found exactly is an important
advantage in comparison with other algorithms, which use value iteration or
policy iteration. The algorithm is polynomial time, more precisely requires
O(s log s) steps (where s is the number of states of the game). It provides
an answer in this particular class of games to the question of the existence of
polynomial time algorithms to solve Simple stochastic games.
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